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nicipality's tort liability was addressed in O'Connor v. City of New
York. In refusing to hold the City liable for the negligent inspec-
tion of a building, the O'Connor Court adhered to the well-estab-
lished New York rule that absent a special relationship creating a
duty owed to the plaintiff, the City remains immune from liability.
In Goncalves v. Regent International Hotels, Ltd., the Court ana-
lyzed section 200 of the General Business Law, and concluded that
the determination of whether a hotel's security system satisfies the
statutory criteria is a question of fact.
In Fiedelman v. New York State Department of Health, the
Court of Appeals held that CPLR 2103, which extends the time of
service when made by mail, does not apply to administrative pro-
ceedings, since such proceedings are not considered pending ac-
tions within the purview of the statute. Also discussed in the Sur-
vey is the Court's decision in In re Estate of Riefberg, in which a
stock buy-sell agreement was held to fall within the statutory defi-
nition of a testamentary substitute under section 5-1.1(b) of the
EPTL.
Finally, in People v. McCray, the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the unrestricted use of peremptory challenges, finding
that the sixth amendment is satisfied when the venire itself con-
sists of a representative cross section of jurors in a jurisdiction.
It is hoped that the cases presented in The Survey will con-
tribute to our readers' understanding of these developments.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
Article 21-Papers
CPLR 2103(b): Extension of time for service by mail does not ap-
ply to administrative proceedings
Section 2103 of the CPLR permits the period during which
legal papers must be served to be extended by 5 days if such ser-
vice is accomplished by mail.' Prior to the enactment of the CPLR,
1 CPLR 2103(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. 1982-1983). Section 2103(b)(2) provides that papers
shall be served upon a party's attorney when an "action" is "pending." Id.; see infra note 3.
Service may be accomplished (1) by personal delivery; (2) by mail to a designated address or
to a last known address; (3) by service at the attorney's office; or (4) where service at an
office is impossible, at the attorney's residence. CPLR 2103(b) (1976 & Supp. 1982-1983).
Any of these methods, except service at an office, may be used instead to serve papers upon
the party himself if the party "has not appeared by an attorney or his attorney cannot be
served." CPLR 2103(c) (1976). These provisions should be distinguished from those con-
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parties to administrative proceedings were able to avail themselves
of this time extension.2 However, many lower courts have held that
the applicable CPLR provision applies only to parties involved in
ongoing litigation.3 Therefore, it has become unclear whether the
cerning the service of summons or subpoena which are governed by rules described else-
where in the CPLR. 2A WK&M T 2103.02, at 21-28; see CPLR 307-316 (1972 & Supp. 1982-
1983) (summons); CPLR 2303 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (subpoena). The CPLR provi-
sion regarding service by mail states in part that, "where a period of time prescribed by law
is measured from the service of a paper and service is by mail, five days shall be added to
the prescribed period." CPLR 2103(b)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). This section was
amended recently to lengthen the extension from 3 to 5 days as of January 1, 1983, ch. 20, §
1, [1982] N.Y. Laws 31 (McKinney), in recognition of the ordinary time necessary for deliv-
ery, CPLR 2103(b), commentary at 81 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); see 2A WK&M 1
2103.06, at 21-37 n.28 (90% of papers mailed arrive within 3 days but 99% arrive within 5).
This extension provision applies to "both the situation in which there must be a minimum
period of notice before an act is to be done and to the situation in which an act is to be done
within a maximum period after service." SECOND REP. 178. Section 2103 of the CPLR is the
product of the combination of CPA sections 163 and 164. See SECOND REP. 177. Section 163
provided for service of papers "in an action" upon the party's attorney and section 164
described the rules for service by post:
Where it is prescribed by statute or in the general rules of practice that a notice
must be given or a paper must be served, within a specified time before an act is
to be done; or that the adverse party has a specified time after notice or service
within which to do an act; if service is made through the post-office, pursuant to
statute or rule, three days shall be added to the time specified ....
Ch. 925, § 164, [1920] N.Y. Laws 75. According to the report of the CPA revisors, no sub-
stantive change between section 164 of the CPA and CPLR 2103(b)(2) was intended. SEc-
oNO REP. 178.
2 See Weingarten v. Cohen, 275 App. Div. 253, 254, 89 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 300 N.Y. 528, 89 N.E.2d 251 (1949). In Weingarten, although the provision of the
Workmen's Compensation Law setting a 6-month limitation on suits by the worker against a
third party did not specify that the period began upon notice of the award, the court liber-
ally construed the statute to the advantage of the worker and added the 3 days provided for
under Section 164 of the CPA. 275 App. Div. at 254, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 357. The injured party's
action was thus timely, although the papers served by mail, from which his period of limita-
tions was measured, were not served in connection with a judicial action. Id.; see R.E. As-
socs. v. McGoldrick, 278 App. Div. 347, 348, 105 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (1st Dep't 1951) (State
Residential Rent Law requiring CPA article 78 proceeding to be brought within 30 days of
order of State Rent Administrator); Doch v. O'Connell, 201 Misc. 80, 82, 107 N.Y.S.2d 348,
350 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1951) (institution of article 78 proceeding to review determina-
tion by the State Liquor Authority).
' See, e.g., Biondo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 90 App. Div. 2d 943, 944, 457
N.Y.S.2d 946, 947 (3d Dep't 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 60 N.Y.2d 832, 458 N.E.2d 371,
470 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1983). The Second Department, in Monarch Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 32 App.
Div. 2d 819, 302 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't 1969), held that section 2103(b) applied only to the
"service of intermediary papers once an action or proceeding has been commenced." Id. at
819, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 434-35 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the court rejected the argu-
ment that 3 days should be added to the petitioner's time to serve notice of an intention to
stay arbitration. Id., 302 N.Y.S.2d at 434. Although Special Term had granted the petitioner
the benefit of the extension, the Appellate Division held that since this was the petitioner's
first application to the court, no judicial proceeding had been commenced. Id., 302 N.Y.S.2d
1983]
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pre-CPLR rule pertaining to administrative proceedings continues
to apply.4 Recently, in Fiedelman v. New York State Department
of Health, the Court of Appeals held that section 2103 of the
CPLR does not apply to administrative proceedings and, thus does
not extend the time within which a party may commence an article
78 proceeding.6
In Fiedelman, the petitioner, a physician, was charged with
dispensing controlled medications without a proper prescription.7
Following an administrative hearing, the Commissioner of Health
fined the petitioner and suspended his right to issue prescriptions.8
On April 3, 1981, the commissioner's order was sent by certified
mail to the petitioner and his attorney9 in accordance with Public
Health Law section 3393(7).10 Judicial review of the order was
available pursuant to article 78 of the CPLR, provided that an ap-
at 434-35. The Third Department also has applied the Monarch rule to the institution of an
article 78 proceeding for review of an order of the Department of Transportation. Express
Limousine Serv., Inc. v. Hennessy, 72 App. Div. 2d 864, 865, 421 N.Y.S.2d 722, 723 (3d
Dep't 1979). Similarly, the First Department affirmed a supreme court ruling that the exten-
sion was not to be applied to the 10-day notice mailed by a landlord in a holdover summary
proceeding. Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Bruncati, 77 Misc. 2d 547, 549, 356 N.Y.S.2d 158,
160 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't), aff'd, 46 App. Div. 2d 743, 360 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1st Dep't
1974). The supreme court in Bruncati held that the 3-day extension was available only "to
service of intermediary papers. . . once a legal action has been duly commenced by service
of process." 77 Misc. 2d at 548-49, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
' See, e.g., In re Moses, 31 App. Div. 2d 772, 772, 296 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (3d Dep't 1969)
(CPLR 2103 held inapplicable where petitioner sought time extension in appeal to the Un-
employment Insurance Appeal Board). The extension also has been sought, with varying
degrees of success, by parties involved in arbitration. Compare In re Manitt Constr. Corp.,
50 Misc. 2d 502, 508, 270 N.Y.S.2d 716, 722 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966) (10-day limita-
tion of CPLR 7503(c) held satisfied where motion to stay arbitration was made 13 days after
mailing of notice of intention to arbitrate) with In re Beverly Cocktail Lounge, 45 Misc. 2d
376, 378, 379, 256 N.Y.S.2d 812, 814-15 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965) (CPLR 2103 held
inapplicable and motion to stay arbitration held untimely) and In re Finest Restaurant
Corp., 52 Misc. 2d 87, 88, 275 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966) (CPLR 2103 held
not available to a party mailing a notice of intention to arbitrate).
5 58 N.Y.2d 80, 445 N.E.2d 1099, 459 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1983).
1 Id. at 81, 445 N.E.2d at 1099, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
88 App. Div. 2d 561, 562, 451 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (1st Dep't 1982) (Fein, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 58 N.Y.2d 80, 445 N.E.2d 1099, 459 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1983).
8 88 App. Div. 2d at 562, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 387 (Fein, J., dissenting).
0 58 N.Y.2d at 81, 445 N.E.2d at 1099, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 420. The commissioner's order
was dated March 26, 1981, but was not mailed until April 3, 1981. 88 App. Div. 2d at 562,
451 N.Y.S.2d at 387 (Fein, J., dissenting). The date of receipt by the petitioner was not an
issue in the decision. Id. at 565, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 390 (Fein, J., dissenting).
10 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3393(7) (McKinney 1977). Service of an order made pursu-
ant to article 33 of the Public Health Law, governing controlled substances, may be accom-
plished "in person, by registered mail or by certified mail upon either the party or an attor-
ney who has appeared on his behalf." Id.
1983] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
plication was filed within 60 days of service.11 Petitioner sought to
invoke this right by serving respondents with an order to show
cause on June 4, 1981, 62 days after the mailing of the commis-
sioner's order.12
Special Term held that CPLR 2103 did not apply to the mail-
ing of the commissioner's decision and dismissed the proceeding as
untimely. 3 The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, 4
holding that the interpretation restricting the statute to judicial
actions was inconsistent with precedent. 15 The Appellate Division
thus allowed the petitioner to avail himself of the 3-day extension
and reinstated the petition.16
The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the petition.1 7 In
a per curiam opinion, the Court held that CPLR 2103 is to be ap-
plied more restrictively than sections 163 and 164 of the CPA.18
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that an administra-
11 58 N.Y.2d at 81, 445 N.E.2d at 1099, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 420. Judicial review pursuant to
article 78 is granted in subdivision 1 of section 3394 of the Public Health Law. See N.Y.
Pun. HEALTH LAW § 3394(1) (McKinney 1977). An application for review may be made by
"the person whose license, certificate, right or privilege is affected" by the administrative
proceeding, or by the attorney for such person. Id. § 3394(2).
12 58 N.Y.2d at 81, 445 N.E.2d at 1099-1100, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21.
11 Id. at 82, 445 N.E.2d at 1100, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
14 88 App. Div. 2d at 561, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 386. Presiding Justice Murphy and Justices
Kupferman and Lynch concurred in the opinion authored by Justice Klein. Justices Fein
and Markewich dissented.
11 88 App. Div. 2d at 561-62, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87. The court cited Weingarten v.
Cohen, 275 App. Div. 253, 254, 89 N.Y.S.2d 356, 356-57 (1st Dep't), af'd, 300 N.Y. 528, 89
N.E.2d 251 (1949), as controlling authority on the issue. 88 App. Div. 2d at 561, 451
N.Y.S.2d at 386. In Weingarten, the 6-month limitation on suits brought after notice of an
award under the Workmen's Compensation Law was extended 3 days pursuant to section
164 of the CPA. 300 N.Y. at 529, 89 N.E.2d at 251.
16 88 App. Div. 2d at 561, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 386. A vigorous dissent urged that judicial
interpretations of CPLR 2103's predecessor provisions should be discounted when applying
the current statute. Id. at 563, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 388 (Fein, J., dissenting). The dissent noted
that the phrase "pending action" in the current provision "has no identical source in the
predecessor statute or rules." Id., 451 N.Y.S.2d at 388-89 (Fein, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original). Noting that CPLR 2103 should be construed literally and not by reference to gen-
eral statutes for analogy, Justice Fein concluded that the difference in the statutory lan-
guage precluded reliance upon interpretations under the prior act. Id., 451 N.Y.S.2d at 388
(Fein, J., dissenting). Thus, reasoned the dissent, since the papers were served in an action
that was not technically "pending," the time extension provision was not available. Id. at
562, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 388 (Fein, J., dissenting). The majority, however, concluded that this
statutory language change amounted to "a difference without a distinction." Id. at 561, 451
N.Y.S.2d at 387.
17 58 N.Y.2d at 83, 445 N.E.2d at 1100, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
18 Id. at 82, 445 N.E.2d at 1100, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
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tive proceeding falls within the definition of an "action."19 The ar-
ticle 78 proceeding, the Court added, was not "pending" prior to
the successful service of the order to show cause. 20 The Court con-
cluded that the petitioner could not avail himself of the extension
provision in order to satisfy the time limitation under Section
3394(2) of the Public Health Law.21
The rules of civil practice and procedure have been held appli-
cable to administrative proceedings where they did not interfere
adversely with expeditious decisionmaking. 22 Thus, the Court's
construction of the term "action" under the CPA did not restrict
application of the statute to judicial actions when a liberal con-
struction would benefit the petitioner seeking to commence an ac-
tion or special proceeding in court.23 It is submitted that a similar
19 Id.
20 Id.; see CPLR 7804(c) (1981 & Supp. 1982-1983) (article 78 proceeding commenced
by notice of petition or order to show cause).
21 58 N.Y.2d at 83, 445 N.E.2d at 1100, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 421. The Court did not decide
whether service of the Commissioner's order was complete upon posting or upon receipt
since the issue was not raised. Id. Generally, however, it is agreed that service, for the pur-
pose of measuring time, is complete upon mailing. See, e.g., 14 Second Ave. Realty Corp. v.
Szalay, 16 App. Div. 2d 919, 919, 229 N.Y.S.2d 722, 723 (1st Dep't 1962); Ralston v. Blum,
105 Misc. 2d 357, 361, 432 N.Y.S.2d 46, 49 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1980); 2A WK&M 1
2103.06, at 21-40.
22 See Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 323-24, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457-58 (1954). Gener-
ally, courtroom principles are not applicable to administrative hearings. See, e.g., Benjamin
v. State Liquor Auth., 13 N.Y.2d 227, 231, 195 N.E.2d 889, 891, 246 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211
(1963). Evans involved a proceeding brought under CPA article 78 to review a police com-
missioner's dismissal of department personnel. 306 N.Y. at 313, 118 N.E.2d at 453. The
Court stated:
The analogy which exists to a greater or less degree, depending upon the cir-
cumstances of the case, between administrative law and court procedure, calls for
drawing parallels wherever possible without defeating the essential objects of the
administrative law .... This tends to assimilate the practice and procedure of
administrative bodies to that of the courts.
Id. at 326, 118 N.E.2d at 459. Thus, the Evans Court applied the law concerning newly
discovered evidence to the administrative determination. Id. Similarly, in Bianca v. Frank,
43 N.Y.2d 168, 371 N.E.2d 791, 401 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1977), the Court held that police officers'
counsel, rather than the officers themselves, must be served with the administrative deter-
mination before the time limitation on institution of a CPLR article 78 proceeding begins,
despite the fact that the applicable administrative code provided only for service of the
papers upon the officer. Id. at 173, 371 N.E.2d at 793-94, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 31. The Bianca
Court reasoned that "in an action or proceeding, whether administrative or judicial," the
"traditional and accepted practice" mandates service upon the party's chosen counsel. Id.,
371 N.E.2d at 794, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 31. The Court analogized this situation to the practice
required by CPLR 2103(b). See id.
"3 See Soffer v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 972, 130 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1954). In Soffer, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles served by mail an order notifying a
motorist that his license had been suspended. The court held that extension was available
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construction of the word "action" should have been applied in the
present case.24
The Court refused to accord precedential value to the inter-
pretations of the predecessor CPA statutes in interpreting CPLR
2103 due to the addition of the word "pending," which forms the
phrase "in a pending action."25 It is submitted that this reasoning
deviates from the traditional rule of construction that a minor lan-
guage change accompanying a complete revision of a code is not
deemed a substantive alteration absent a clear manifestation of
legislative intent to effect such a change.26 The revisors of the CPA
did not indicate an intention to accord substantive significance to
the addition of the word "pending. '27  It is therefore submitted
under Section 164 of the CPA to the motorist who sought administrative review of the sus-
pension. Id. at 973-74, 130 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
"' The Fiedelman Court's ruling that an administrative proceeding is not an "action" is
technically correct. The Fiedelman decision follows the holding of Luoma v. Spearin, Pres-
ton & Burrows, Inc., 282 App. Div. 612, 126 N.Y.S.2d 543 (3d Dep't 1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y.
728, 121 N.E.2d 544 (1954), which stated that "[a] proceeding under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law is not an action or special proceeding under the Civil Practice Act but a
statutory proceeding having its own rules as to limitations." Id. at 614-15, 126 N.Y.S.2d at
546; see also In re Callahan, 262 App. Div. 398, 399, 28 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982 (3d Dep't 1941)
("action" is not synonymous with "proceeding"). An action has been defined as "an ordi-
nary prosecution in a court of justice by a party against another party for the enforcement
or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong or the punishment of a public
offense." Abraham, A Unitary Approach to Special Proceedings: The New York Proposals,
9 BUFFALO L. Rv. 471, 478 (1960) (emphasis in original). A special proceeding has been
defined as "a form of civil judicial proceeding which must be based on specific statutory
authorization." Town of Johnstown v. City of Gloversville, 36 App. Div. 2d 143, 144-45, 319
N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (3d Dep't 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 32 N.Y.2d 1, 295 N.E.2d 644, 342
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1973); see In re Chariot Textiles Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 762, 763, 250
N.Y.S.2d 493, 494 (1st Dep't 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 18 N.Y.2d 793, 221 N.E.2d 913,
275 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1966). Since administrative proceedings are neither judicial proceedings
nor special proceedings pursuant to CPLR 105(b), the Fiedelman Court's ruling that an
administrative proceeding is not an action comports with the technical distinctions between
these terms.
25 58 N.Y.2d at 82, 445 N.E.2d at 1100, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
2' In Schneider v. Schneider, 17 N.Y.2d 123, 216 N.E.2d 318, 269 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1966),
the Court of Appeals stated that "where the Legislature votes a general revision of a code
with hundreds of changes we will not interpret a minor change in language to indicate a
meaning unless legislative purpose so to change the meaning is clear." Id. at 127, 216 N.E.2d
at 320, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 110 (citing Henavie v. New York Cent. & H.R. R.R., 154 N.Y. 278,
281, 48 N.E. 525, 526 (1897); Lynk v. Weaver, 128 N.Y. 171, 177, 28 N.E. 508, 509 (1891));
see Evans v. Gardner, 71 Misc. 2d 283, 285-86, 336 N.Y.S.2d 28, 32 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1972); CPLR 104, commentary at 36 (1972).
21 See SECOND REP. 178; supra note 1. Many lower courts, however, have interpreted
the language change in CPLR 2103 as a substantive one. See, e.g., Carassavas v. New York
State Dep't of Social Servs., 90 App. Div. 2d 630, 630, 456 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (3d Dep't
1982); Jackson v. New York, 85 App. Div. 2d 818, 818, 445 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (3d Dep't
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:182
that by minimizing the precedential value of the decisions under
the CPA, the Fiedelman Court contravened the legislature's intent
in enacting CPLR 2103.2s The Court also seems to have cast doubt
upon the validity of a rule of construction which has long guided
the Court's interpretation of statutory recodifications.
It is further contended that the Fiedetman Court neglected
the broad policy underlying article 78 of the CPLR, which, by sim-
plifying the method of obtaining judicial review, was designed to
benefit parties aggrieved by administrative decisions.29 In addition,
the Court's holding that petitoners cannot invoke CPLR 2103(b)
before the commencement of a special proceeding under CPLR ar-
ticle 78 denies them the advantages which have been afforded cer-
tain other petitioners seeking judicial review of administrative de-
cisions.3 0 The Court's rejection of the liberal operation of the CPA
1981), appeal dismissed, 56 N.Y.2d 568, 435 N.E.2d 402, 450 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1982); Cosmo-
politan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moliere, 31 App. Div. 2d 924, 924, 298 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (1st Dep't
1969).
28 See Syracuse Mortgage Corp. v. Kepler, 122 Misc. 95, 97, 202 N.Y.S. 193, 194 (Sup.
Ct. Onondaga County 1923). In construing a provision of the CPA, the court held that
"[w]here the new act continues phrases from the old act, which it supersedes, that have
been judicially construed, such cases are of value in determining the meaning of those
phrases as used in [the current act]." Id. If a section of the CPLR has been deemed a
"recodification" of a provision in the CPA, without substantive change, cases decided prior
to recodification are dispositive. Lunger v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 38 App. Div. 2d
857, 858, 330 N.Y.S.2d 123, 125 (2d Dep't 1972).
" Administrative agencies are the "primary target" of CPLR article 78 proceedings
against bodies or officers. SIEGEL § 557, at 774. One objective of the revisors was to "simplify
and clarify" the procedures to be followed in challenging the orders and determinations of
such agencies in court. Hesson, The Proposed Revision of the New York Law of Civil Proce-
dure, 25 ALa. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1961).
so Under the Executive Law, parties aggrieved by an order of the State Division of
Human Rights may bring a proceeding for judicial review in the appellate division of the
supreme court. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 298 (McKinney 1982). Courts have indicated that a pro-
ceeding brought pursuant to this section would not be untimely when service of the order is
made by mail if the petition for judicial review is made within the required period of 30
days, plus 3 days for mailing. E.g., Caraballo v. State Div. on Human Rights, 59 App. Div.
2d 871, 871, 399 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (1st Dep't 1977); Denson v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc.,
45 App. Div. 2d 931, 931, 357 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (4th Dep't 1974); State Div. of Human
Rights v. Ganley, 37 App. Div. 2d 983, 983, 327 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (2d Dep't 1971).
While the courts in Caraballo, Denson, and Ganley applied the CPLR 2103 extension
to administrative proceedings involving the State Division on Human Rights, the extension
provision has not been applied to other administrative proceedings. See supra note 3. More-
over, a number of decisions involving administrative proceedings to which CPLR 2103 has
been held inapplicable have been based upon specific statutory regulation of the agency or
appeals from the administrative body rather than construction of CPLR 2103. For example,
since the labor law explicitly provided for appeal "within twenty days after mailing or per-
sonal delivery of notice," N.Y. LAB. LAW § 621(1) (McKinney 1977) (emphasis added), The
Appellate Division, Third Department, held CPLR 2103 inapplicable. In re Moses, 31 App.
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is a disturbing indication of its desire to construe the CPLR nar-
rowly31 and to sanction such a restrictive approach by the lower
courts.
Jane M. Knight
CIvIL RIGHTS LAW
Civ. Rights Law § 51: An infant may not disaffirm prior parental
consent to the commercial publication of her photograph
Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law 2 estab-
lish the right of any living person to prevent the nonconsensual
commercial exploitation of his or her name or likeness.33 The pro-
Div. 2d 772, 772, 296 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (3d Dep't 1969); see also In re Berent, 86 App. Div.
2d 764, 766, 448 N.Y.S.2d 282, 285 (4th Dep't 1982) (section 675 of the Insurance Law held
controlling).
Section 3394 of the Public Health Law, the statute at issue in Fiedelman, provides that
review must be made "within sixty days after service of the order" of the Commissioner.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3394(2) (McKinney 1977). There is no mention of the type of
service to be made. See id. It is submitted that the lack of specificity of this statute distin-
guishes Fiedelman from other decisions holding CPLR 2103 inapplicable to administrative
proceedings. Moreover, in light of the lack of clarity in the Public Health Law, it is sug-
gested that consistency with the purposes of the CPLR and administrative law militates in
favor of granting a petitioner the benefit of the time extension.
31The narrow construction contravenes the CPLR's mandate to construe provisions lib-
erally. See CPLR 104 (1972).
32 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976). Section 50 of the Civil Rights Law
provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without hav-
ing first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her
parent or guardian, is guility of a misdemeanor.
Id. § 50.
Civil remedies for invasion of privacy are provided for in section 51 of the Civil Rights
Law:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for ad-
vertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first
obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action . . . against the
person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent and
restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries
sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly used
such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared
to be unlawful by section fifty... the jury, in its discretion, may award exem-
plary damages.
Id. § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
33 A common-law right of privacy was rejected in New York in Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 556, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902). See Kiss v. County of Putnam,
